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Automating Negotiation for M-Services
Shamimabi Paurobally, Phillip J. Turner, and Nicholas R. Jennings
Abstract—Mobile electronic commerce (m-commerce) is an
emerging manifestation of internet electronic commerce that
bridges the domains of Internet, mobile computing and wireless
telecommunications in order to provide an array of sophisticated
services (m-services) to mobile users. To date, much of the
research in the area has concentrated on the problem of service
discovery. However, once a service has been discovered, it needs
to be provisioned according to the goals and constraints of the
service provider and the service consumer. Since, in general, these
will be different stakeholders (with different aims), the de facto
provisioning method will be some form of negotiation. To this end,
this paper develops automated negotiation protocols and strategies
that are applicable in m-commerce environments. Specifically,
we develop and evaluate time-constrained bilateral negotiation
algorithms, that allow software agents to adapt to the quality of
the network and/or their experience of similar interactions.
Index Terms—Agents, automated negotiation, m-services.
I. INTRODUCTION
FUTURE generation mobile telecommunication systemsare increasingly being viewed as open market places in
which the various stakeholders produce and consume services
[1]. This view yields a convergence of electronic commerce,
wireless networks and the Internet. Examples of such m-ser-
vices include mobile shopping (e.g., Mr. Smith’s software
agent books a flight from a PDA, then reserves a rental car and
a restaurant on his arrival), location-sensitive information (e.g.,
obtaining map services, local hotels, and weather information),
telemetry (e.g., receiving traffic updates and logistics tracking)
and mobile banking (e.g., billing of services, buying stocks and
contacting banks through mobile devices).
As these examples imply, to be truly effective m-services
have to be both customised and personalised, while being lo-
cation-sensitive and context-aware. For example, in terms of lo-
cation sensitiveness and personalization, en route to the airport
Mr. Smith’s agent might receive updates on the traffic routes,
road works and weather information. Context-awareness would,
for example, customise the information display according to
whether Mr. Smith has a passenger who is helping him analyze
the traffic and weather updates (e.g., if Mr. Smith is alone, then
only keywords would be displayed in a larger font, otherwise
if there is a passenger then more details would be given, along
with a map and landmarks, for the passenger to read and ana-
lyze). In terms of customization and personalization, Mr. Smith
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may either prefer to be presented with traffic updates for the
whole route to the destination or only local information updates
for the next two miles. Moreover, these updates may take into
account Mr. Smith’s driving skills (e.g., driving in the fast or
slower lanes on the motorway) and his preferences of how to
present the information (e.g., graphically and/or as audio).
In order to offer m-services with such properties and, at the
same time, to be effective at the speeds and capacities demanded
in wireless systems, the processes of service discovery, service
provisioning and service execution need to be automated to a sig-
nificant extent. Since these operations have to be performed in
a highly dynamic, uncertain and unpredictable environment it is
important that the software systems can act and interact in flex-
ible ways in order to achieve their objectives. To this end, the indi-
vidual service producers and consumers can naturally be viewed
assoftwareagents(sincetheseareexactly thepropertiesandtypes
of environment that lend themselves to an agent-based approach
[2]). Specifically, these agents are able to meet their design ob-
jectives by having control over their own behavior (autonomy),
having the ability to respond to changes in their environment (re-
activity), and the ability to act in anticipation of their aims (proac-
tivity) [3]. Now, since the agents are autonomous and because
theyrepresentdifferentorganizations,withdifferentaimsandob-
jectives, the de facto means by which they will interact is some
formofnegotiation [4] (heredefinedasa formofdecisionmaking
where two or more agents jointly search a space of possible solu-
tions with the goal of reaching a consensus).
Against this background, this paper investigates the require-
ments and mechanisms for automated negotiation for m-services
in a m-commerce environment. In particular, we focus on bilat-
eral negotiations (since these are common in such environments
[5]) and given our aim to deploy such systems we focus on the
performance aspect of the negotiations. In more detail, we first
discuss the characteristics of wireless communications that ef-
fect agent negotiations. Taking into account the quality of the un-
derlying communication network and an agent’s interaction ex-
periences, a bilateral protocol is developed and combined with
decision-making mechanisms for evaluating and generating ex-
changed sets of negotiation issues. We then evaluate these algo-
rithms with respect to the key performance metrics for this do-
main.
This paper advances the state of the art by proposing an
automated negotiation facility that allows agents to adapt to
their prevailing situation in mobile telecommunication envi-
ronments. From the network’s perspective, our work extends
current research in software-based mobile telecommunications
to more sophisticated forms of multiissue negotiation for the
provision of personalised services. From an agent-oriented per-
spective, we design automated negotiation mechanisms to cope
with the limitations imposed by the underlying communication
1083-4427/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE
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infrastructure. In particular, the objective is to demonstrate that
automated negotiation permits a high degree of flexibility in
establishing new m-services. Toward this end, we extend the
alternating offers protocol that is normally used in time-con-
strained settings [6]–[8] to incorporate an interaction state.
For example, in the stateless alternating offers protocol, it is
always possible to perform offers and counter-offers, to make
agreements and send rejections. In constrast in our protocol, an
agent has to take into account previous actions and past states
in order to infer the next possible actions and states. Morevoer,
the time, experience and network aware negotiation strategies
we develop can also refer to previous, current and allowable
future sequences of interaction states in order to determine
how to respond. Thus, for different negotiation threads, similar
sequences of states may yield different results depending on
the run-time dynamics. Such adaptation to limited resources
is important in m-commerce environments because there are
inevitably strong resource-bounds and a high degree of vari-
ability in the underlying infrastructure. When taken together,
these characteristics mean adaptation is essential if an agent is
to effectively achieve its goals.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way.
Section II relates the m-service and the agent paradigms. Sec-
tion III discusses the various technologies and requirements for
automating m-service negotiation. Sections IV and V specify
the bilateral negotiation mechanisms – covering both the pro-
tocol and the decision making algorithms. Section VI discusses
the performance of the algorithms with respect to the identified
set of metrics. Section VII summarizes related work and Sec-
tion VIII concludes.
II. M-COMMERCE AND SOFTWARE AGENTS
M-commerce is concerned with the set of applications and
services accessible from Internet-enabled mobile devices [1]. It
has a number of requirements over and above those of more tra-
ditional e-commerce including services that are accessible over
wireless networks and that are adaptable according to the char-
acteristics of the mobile devices for which they are configured
and on which they are run [9].
In this area, I-Mode [10] by NTT DoCoMo is an example
of an early m-commerce application, offering wireless web
browsing and e-mail from mobile phones, where the users are
charged according to the volume of data transmitted. As the
technology progresses, location-sensitive and context-aware
services will become a more routine part of the offering. For
example, users of location-sensitive devices will be able to
search for directions to nearby restaurants, banks and similar
listed events in their area. Moreover, the limited screen size,
low data rates associated with mobile Internet devices, rapid
deployment of accurate location-tracking technology, as well
as the time critical nature of many of the tasks in which mobile
users engage, are all likely to contribute to the increasing
demand for mobile location-sensitive services [1].
As it currently stands, the limitations of the mobile devices
constrain the accessibility of m-services. Therefore, m-com-
merce does not support the full hyper-, multimedia found on the
wired Internet and requires well-targeted and concise content
Fig. 1. Negotiation by exchanging speech-acts and a negotiation subject.
presented to the user. For example, animations, banners and
lists of results from search engines are difficult to present on
mobile phones. For this reason, customers need to be presented
with services that are relevant to their current locations, prefer-
ences and activities. This, in turn, requires smarter interfaces
and applications that learn from users’ behaviors [11].
To achieve such personalization, negotiation can be used in
the trading of both telecommunications services and high-level
services between participants in an open electronic market. As
an illustration of the former, consider the case of Mr. Smith who
routinely undertakes a train journey. The agents on his PDA
may negotiate for bandwidth so that he can watch the news,
without interference from other used frequencies, as he travels.
Thus, the agents can provide smart and dynamically config-
urable networks for increased performance and robustness, fore-
seeing faults and changes in the environment. As an illustration
of the latter, Mr. Smith’s agent may learn the types of films and
documentaries that he likes to watch and (bilaterally) negotiate
to receive such multimedia presentations from different content
providers. The agents may also learn how Mr. Smith would like
the MPEG-4 files to be displayed (e.g., full-screen, brightness
and sound-level).
Achieving this vision is a difficult task. Wireless networks
present a significant challenge for automating agent interactions
because such mobile communications fall prey to low band-
width, bounded coverage, latency, error rates and spurious con-
nections (as discussed more fully in Section III-B). For this
reason, negotiation models that are specifically tailored to the
m-service domain need to be developed.
III. AUTOMATED M-SERVICE NEGOTIATION
As discussed previously, negotiation is fundamental to the
provision and management of m-services in a marketplace
model. However, automating this negotiation is a challenge that
requires the following components to be exploited.
• Agent languages [12], usually in the form of speech-acts
[13], specify the structure of exchanged messages and per-
formatives (see Fig. 1).
• Protocols define the norms that govern a negotiation. They
specify the actions (sequences of messages) permissible
by an agent leading to some state [14]. If all agents comply
with the same interaction protocol, they can expect certain
responses from others and carry out a conversation.
• A group of agents negotiate about a set of issues called
a negotiation subject. This set of issues can be in the
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Fig. 2. M-commerce scenario involving negotiation for a travelling customer.
form of name-value pairs, e.g., renting a car with attributes
{(commodity, car), (color, black), (engine, bmw), (price,
10 000)} as in Fig. 1. At the beginning of a negotiation,
the set of issues each agent sends to the other may not
fall in the intersection zone of their preferences (meaning
an agreement is not possible). Usually, the participants
can modify the issues and their values, for example, when
evaluating and generating responses in an interaction. Ne-
gotiations terminate when the set of issues satisfies all the
agents’ preferences (an agreement is reached) or when
one of the parties teminates the encounter (for whatever
reason). For the sake of conciseness, in the rest of this
paper, we refer to values for sets of issues as sets of is-
sues or the issue set.
• Each agent needs an evaluation function for a negotiation
subject that reflects the agent’s preferences. An agent
chooses its strategies privately for evaluating, gener-
ating and deciding on its next course of action. An agent
uses some decision process to determine its positions,
concessions and criteria for agreement and since it is
self-interested, it will choose the strategy that gives it the
best return.
A. Automated M-Service Negotiation Scenario
Having defined the basic building blocks of automated ne-
gotiation, this subsection examines in more detail the negotia-
tions involved in a typical m-service scenario (Fig. 2). In this
context, the labels on the arrows represent a particular order
of exchanges between the participants. Thus, information flows
between the entities as they negotiate with each other for ser-
vices. Here Mr. Smith wishes his agent on his PDA to plan his
New York trip while he travels to and around the city. As Mr
Smith moves through different wireless networks, his agent has
to adapt its negotiation behavior to the quality of the service of
TABLE I
INTERACTIONS IN THE TRAVELING CUSTOMER SCENARIO
the prevailing network. Specifically, the interactions involving
Agent Smith are shown in Table I.
In more detail, Fig. 3 shows an instance of a conversation be-
tweenAgentSmithandotherparties,whileMr.Smith is travelling
in the taxi to the restaurant. In particular, we show a subset of the
messages sent in the three concurrent negotiation threads, to
in Fig. 3. In this situation, Agent Smith is simultaneously
negotiatingwith theeveningorganizerabout theatre tickets,a tour
guide for a visit of New York on the next day, and with a friend,
(friend ) toaccompanyhimon thevisit.WhilstMr.Smith is in the
taxi, the quality of his wireless connection via his PDA changes
with migration between networks (covering the business district,
the old town and thesuburbs).To this end, let us consider the more
detailed message exchange when the taxi is travelling in the old
town (centre box in Fig. 3). At this point, the performance of the
network isaroundaverageand thisallowsAgentSmith toconduct
simultaneous negotiation threads with the evening organizer, the
tour guide and his friend .
• Message exchange between Agent Smith and the evening
organizer.
– : The evening organizer proposes to Agent Smith
tickets to watch the play Othello at $70.
– :AgentSmithcanaffordtobargainandreplieswith
anotherproposal towatch theplayHamlet,withbalcony
seating at a price of $30.
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Fig. 3. Instance of a message exchange in the travelling customer scenario.
• MessageexchangebetweenAgentSmithandthetourguide.
– : The tour guide suggests to Agent Smith a visit
to the Times Square and China Town at 9:30 the next
morning.
– :AgentSmithalsochoosestobargainwith thetour
guide and requests a visit to the Times Square and China
Town, but at 11:00 the next morning.
• Message exchange between Agent Smith and friend .
– : Friend wishes to discuss a visit to Long Island
and the Gold Coast at noon the next day.
– : A gent Smith instead proposes to to ac-
company him to the Times Square and Chinatown at
11:00 the next morning.
As Mr. Smith’s taxi travels in the suburb (lower box in
Fig. 3), the quality of the network decreases and there is a
loss of performance in the communication layer underpinning
Agent Smith’s conversations. As a consequence of this degra-
dation, Agent Smith suspends its negotiation threads with the
tour guide and his friend for visiting New York the next day
(because they are less urgent). Agent Smith continues negoti-
ating with the evening organizer, but to expedite the process
it sends an ultimatum (take it or leave it offer) to buy Othella
theatre tickets for $60 with seating in the stalls. Thus it can
be seen that the environment limits Agent Smith’s resources
and the agent has to respond accordingly (by decreasing the
number of concurrent negotiations, conceding more quickly or
reaching an agreement fast).
On the other hand, if Mr. Smith’s taxi travelled to the busi-
ness district (top box in Fig. 3), it may experience a more effi-
cient and reliable network connection. In this case, Agent Smith
can not only keep its existing negotiation threads, but may also
increase its number of negotiations and decide to bargain more.
Hence, Agent Smith might discuss and bargain more with the
evening organizer to obtain an even better deal. For example,
Agent Smith can now download bigger files faster, and may ask
for an MPEG presentation of New York from the tour guide and
may wish to discuss in more details the tour for the next day.
In addition, Agent Smith may now negotiate with two friends
concurrently, instead of sequentially, so as to plan the rest of his
stay in New York.
In summary, the scenario shows that there can be many dif-
ferent parties that need to negotiate. These negotiations are often
bilateral and they may also be concurrent. Each negotiation has
its own parties, subject of negotiation, history and current ne-
gotiation state. In addition, each negotiation is differently influ-
enced by environmental factors such as the quality of the net-
work, the market dynamics or the neighboring agents.
B. Wireless Operational Factors Effecting Negotiation
In earlier generation networks, low data rates and long con-
nection set-up times in mobile devices gave rise to concerns
for optimization of the quality of the network (especially when
persistent connections were needed for downloading from the
Internet). Currently, some of these problems have been alle-
viated, but nevertheless mobile and fixed hosts still have dif-
ferent constraints in terms of power supply, latency or available
memory. Therefore, since the agents have to operate in such en-
vironments, these factors need to be taken into account when
designing the system (in general) and its interactions (in par-
ticular). In our context, this means different negotiation algo-
rithms have to be specified for different situations. For example,
it makes sense for mobile devices to be involved in short nego-
tiations whereas fixed hosts can take part in continous and com-
putationally expensive encounters.
Given this, when designing negotiation mechanisms for mo-
bile environments, the peculiar characteristics of wireless de-
vices and networks must be considered. In particular, the con-
straints of mobile telecommunications are often inter-related
where the quality of service (QoS) may itself be parameterised
with the other characteristics of the network (e.g., bandwidth,
range, frequency of disconnections, costs of connection, data
integrity, and security) [15]. For example, the variation in band-
width and QoS of the underlying network means negotiation
mechanisms should adapt to the varying environment conditions
so as to adopt compensating actions and still find mutually ac-
ceptable agreements. That is, the QoS of the network could be
used to influence the rates of concession and the decisions of an
agent of whether to agree to a suboptimal deal. For example, if
the QoS is low then an agent might agree to the first acceptable
offer, while if the QoS is high, then it may try to bargain, search
for the best deal and maximize its profit. Bandwidth limitations
and fluctuations could also restrict the number of simultaneous
users involved in a negotiation and the number of messages re-
quired to terminate the negotiation. For example, if the battery
is running out, then an agent may decide to concede and quickly
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find an agreement or notify the others that it will soon suspend
the negotiation. If the memory and processing power are partic-
ularly limited in a mobile device, then an agent can choose not
to adopt complex strategies. In the case of increased latency and
loss of network performance, an agent may choose to timeout
or increase its time to compute its strategies and plans while
waiting for a message.
C. Application Level Features Effecting Negotiation
There are also a number of features of the application (agent)
level that effect the negotiation in this domain. While some of
these features can also apply to wired networks, they tend to be
more prominent in mobile telecommunications.
• Scalability and availability. The system must be able to
cope with a large number of negotiations at any one in-
stant.
• Graceful Degradation. Mobile communications systems
are characterized by temporary failure, arbitrary or inten-
tional transience of connectivity and reduced network per-
formance due to resource shortages. In such situations, the
negotiations must degrade gracefully with only bounded
loss.
• Fraud prevention and detection. Robustness against fraud
is essential if negotiation services are to be widely trusted
and accepted. Thus, a malicious party (supplier or cus-
tomer) should not be able to make significant fraudulent
gains from repeated induced failures or by exploiting
the fact that wireless communications are more prone to
disconnections than wired ones. For example, an agent
should not be able to negotiate to learn about the prefer-
ences of its opponents and then pretend that the wireless
communication has failed just before an agreement is
made. Knowing that its opponent is desperate for a service
(e.g., its deadline is close), the agent then restarts another
negotiation, after purposefully waiting for some time, and
exploits the constraints of its opponent.
• Deadlines. Deadlines, as part of the resources of an agent,
are important determinants of behavior. For example, an
agent needs to consider whether its deadline is close and
reach an agreement fast or whether it has enough time to
bargain.
In summary, both the characteristics of the telecommunica-
tion and the market environment influence the choice of nego-
tiation mechanisms and the behaviors of the negotiating agents.
Given this, the next section develops negotiation mechanisms
that are suitable for m-commerce.
IV. NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS
This section specifies mechanisms for negotiating for m-ser-
vices between two agents. First, we specify a bilateral negotia-
tion protocol as a pattern of high-level message exchange that
two agents may follow in interacting with one another. The pro-
tocol may be regarded as the set of public rules or guidelines
indicating the conduct of an agent toward other agents when
carrying out the negotiation. Then, we design three possible
strategies (adaptive to time, adaptive to time and quality of the
network, and adaptive to past experience), within the same bi-
lateral protocol. The agent designer is free to choose which of
these strategies should be used for evaluating, generating and
deciding on its next action or an agent may be designed to au-
tonomously vary its strategies depending on its constraints and
the environment. This choice is private to the agent.
1) Time-dependent strategy, considers the deadline of an
agent. This strategy may be extended to consider the re-
sources of an agent, its opponent’s behaviors or trade-off
deals instead of successive concessions.
2) Network-aware strategy, , allows an agent to take into
account the variations in the quality of the network in its
concessions.
3) Experience strategy, , takes into account the experience
of an agent gained from previous and parallel negotia-
tions, possibly with similar parameters (for example, the
same opponents, similar subjects of negotiation, prefer-
ences and constraints).
We choose the above strategies for several reasons. Strategies
and are useful in m-commerce since an agent has time con-
straints and has to adapt to a varying network (as discussed in
Section III). The strategy emphasises an agent’s social envi-
ronment since information about past and current negotiations
allows an agent to make informed decisions, minimize the risk
of disagreements and avoid wasting resources (which are lim-
ited in m-commerce settings). The strategies may be combined
and given weights to take into account the relative importance of
various environmental aspects. For example, the two strategies
and may be combined to obtain a hybrid strategy that
considers both the quality of the network and the previous expe-
riences of an agent. Such a hybrid strategy allows more flexible
agent behavior, since more operational factors are considered.
However, hybrid strategies also require more resources in terms
of computational time, power and space and these may not al-
ways be available in m-commerce domains.
The rationale for the formulation of these strategies lies with
our focus on automating negotiation for m-services rather than
proposing new negotiation theories and analysis in m-commerce.
Quoting from [16], “a key issue here (in multiagent systems) is
that, since we are interested in actually building agents that will
be capable of negotiating on our behalf, it is not enough simply
to have agents that get the best outcome in theory—they must be
able to obtain the best outcome in practice.” Therefore we pur-
posefully choose to develop practical strategies and to concen-
trate on how they adapt and learn from experiences in their en-
vironment. Thus, this paper is not concerned with a solely theo-
retical formulation and analysis of the strategies. Rather, we are
concerned with how the negotiating agents evaluate and generate
values for sets of issues, given sequences of states and a variety of
available speech-acts.
A. Bilateral Protocol
Generally speaking, protocols are used to coordinate the activ-
ities of a group of agents as they try to satisfy their goals. In par-
ticular, this section specifies a protocol [17] between two agents
looking for an agreement over a negotiation subject. The protocol
allows requests, proposals, offers and agreements and may form
the basis for further customization to allow richer interactions.
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Fig. 4. Bilateral protocol.
In more detail, Fig. 4 gives the statechart of a bilateral pro-
tocol between agents X and Y. The protocol is portrayed in a
statechart (instead of in other notations such as sequence dia-
grams or Petri nets because of the lack of expressiveness of the
latter notations for showing multiagent interactions [14]).1
Entry in the negotiation is through either agent performing
an initial_request, initial_offer or initial_propose message
leading to an open state and more precisely to a requested,
offered or proposed state respectively. For example, the process
X.initial_request means that agent X sent an initial_request
leading to a requested(X) state. The state requested(X) is read
as agent X has triggered the state requested. Each state may
be interpreted as conveying a level of commitment toward an
agreement. For example an agreed state entails more commit-
ment than a requested state. A reject action or timeout event can
occur at any sub-state of an open state. From a requested state,
both agents can continuously make suggest actions to remain
in that state while modifying the subject of negotiation until
one of them wants to move to a higher level of commitment
through an offer or propose. The proposed state is a sub-state
of offered and both of these states may allow an agreement
to follow in the next action (leading to an agreed state). The
difference between offered and proposed is that from the
former state, an agent can only agree or reject whereas from
the proposed state, an agent may agree, reject or return to a
requested state through a request. We also allow the two agents
to restart a timedout negotiation through forking into another
bilateral negotiation with the negotiation subject being whether
to restart the interaction.
B. Time-Dependent Strategy ( )
This section specifies the decision making mechanisms for an
agent according to its resources or its opponent’s behavior (and
is broadly based on [18]). The strategy depends on an agent’s
deadline or its reservation values. Decision theory [19] is used
in this context as it is suitable for analyzing different alternatives
under uncertain conditions and unknown outcomes of an action.
As discussed earlier, the structure of a negotiation subject is a
set of issue-value pairs. A rational agent aims to maximize its
gain which depends on the result of an evaluation of the agreed
set of issues. Such evaluation functions allow an agent to eval-
uate messages from other agents and to generate a new set of
1For example, in these notations, the roles are not bound to an agent’s identity,
timeouts and reject messages are hard to represent and, in their standard forms,
there is no concept of an agent performing an action.
issues to respond with. As in [20], we consider a negotiation
between two agents a and b over a changeable set of issues .
An issue , ( ), can take values between [ ],
which define the domain, , of a quantitative issue and is ef-
fectively the reservation values of an agent. The domain of a
qualitative issue is defined as an ordered set of possible values as
in . Currently in our experiments, an agent’s
reservation values and the domain of the qualitative issues are
provided by the designer. However, in long-running simulations,
these values can be learnt by an agent via its experience strategy.
1) Evaluation Mechanisms: Similar to [20], let a and b des-
ignate two negotiating agents; let be a set of pairs of issues and
their values, as in { (price,30), (quantity,2)}. Let designate an
issue and let be the value of the th issue in the set . Let
the term ( ) denote the negotiation subject, a set consisting
of values associated to independent issues, sent from agent b to
a at time .
Evaluation of ( ) involves summing the valuation (score)
of each issue in the negotiation subject. The evaluation function
of agent a about an issue is given by where
. A weight is associated by agent a to issue where
the sum of weights of all issues is 1. An agent can change its
preferences for an issue by changing the weights associated to
that issue. A set , consisting of issues , is rated by agent a as
(1)
2) Offer Generation Mechanisms: An agent may adopt a be-
havior, according to its strategy and constraints such as time
here, when generating a set of issues and in calculating how
much to concede (e.g., it concedes more nearer to its deadline, as
the level of its resource diminishes or as its opponent concedes).
Here, we develop time-dependent, , and opponent-depen-
dent, , behaviors. The following defines a time-depen-
dent behavior. Let denote agent a’s deadline. de-
notes the set of issues, , an agent a sends to agent b at time ,
according to strategy [18]. denotes the issue in
the set .
if is decreasing (2)
if is increasing (3)
At the start of a negotiation, an agent does not normally con-
cede and at its deadline the agent concedes to its reservation
limit.
In the opponent-dependent behavior, an agent determines its
concessions based on the previous attitudes of its opponents
(from steps ago).
(4)
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TABLE II
WEIGHTS ASSOCIATED TO TIME AND OPPONENT STRATEGIES
The set of issues agent a generates at time is within a’s
acceptable values and proportionally imitates b’s behaviors.
An agent generates its response by using a weighed combina-
tion of the time-dependent ( ) and opponent-dependent
( ) behaviors. The weights associated to the two behav-
iors depend on the amount of time left until an agent’s deadline
(ordered increasingly by the predicates much_time_left,
middle_time_left, less_time_left and no_time_left). For ex-
ample, if there is no_time_left, then an agent prefers the
time-dependent behavior ( ) so as to show more adaptation
to the limited time. Whereas if there is much_time_left, an
agent places more importance on the opponent-dependent
behavior so as to gain more when time is not scarce. For
example, Table II shows how the preferences of an agent for a
strategy can be varied with the closeness of its deadline, where
the weights are normalized and grounded in this case. Broadly
speaking, this strategy shows that as time elapses, an agent’s
behavior becomes predominantly time-dependent.
For more general functions, at time , the weights associ-
ated to time-dependent or opponent-dependent strategies follow
simple decay functions with a rate of growth denoted by .
These functions reflect the relative importance placed on each
strategy according to the time left, which is itself the difference
between an agent’s deadline and the current time. We use decay
functions since they are simple to compute.
(5)
(6)
From (1)–(6), it can be seen that strategy evaluates and
generates a set of issues according to an agent’s deadline, the
importance it attaches to an issue, its reservation values and the
opposing agent’s concession rates.
C. Network-Aware Strategy ( )
The time-dependent strategy, , can be modified into a net-
work-aware strategy, , in which an agent adapts its negotia-
tion behavior to variations in the quality of the network (as dis-
cussed in Section III-B). Since our focus is on the influence of
the underlying mobile environment, we extend only the time-de-
pendent strategy to be network-aware, although more complex
strategies that are independent of the network [21] could be sim-
ilarly extended. From the list in Section III-B, we choose quality
of service of the network as a parameter in our algorithms be-
cause QoS encapsulates many of the other features (in particular
latency and bandwith variations [15]). Moreover, there are al-
ready substantial research efforts that relate QoS to the charac-
teristics of mobile computing environments where bandwidth,
throughput, timeliness, reliability, cost and perceived quality are
the foundations of QoS [15].
In this context, denotes the response computed
by agent a to agent b for issue at time using the above strategy
. Similarly, denotes the response computed by
agent a to agent b for issue at time using the strategy below.
Agent a adjusts its computed response according to
strategy to obtain a new network-aware response .
We take care that adjustments to obtain do not yield
a set of issues outside the reservation values of agent a. In ad-
dition, the new set of issues computed from strategy , at time
, should not undo the concessions at time ( ) and previ-
ously. For example, if a decreased the price from $25 to $20 at
time ( ), then the network-aware strategy at time returns
a price not more than $20. This is necessary because otherwise
an agent would erratically concede and nullify its previous con-
cessions with improvements in the network quality. This would,
in turn, reverse the convergence toward an agreement between
the parties. Given this constraint, two cases arise: 1) there is no
previous message at ( ) i.e., is the first mes-
sage a is sending to b in that negotiation instance; 2) there is a
previous message . Let embody the quality of the
network between agents a and b and be parameterised from the
bandwidth, latency, error rates and rate of disconnections (as
discussed above). The response of a to b according to strategy
is calculated as below. The final response for the network-aware
behavior considers both and depending
on the criticality of the deadline versus the quality of the net-
work.
1) No previous messages at ( )
is decreasing (7)
if is increasing (8)
2) Previous Message
if is decreasing (9)
(10)
Strategy exponentially adjusts the value of an issue as the
QoS of the network varies. However it is ensured that the value
of the issue is between its reservation values, but not less than
what was sent by that agent before (to ensure consistent con-
cessions). For example, if an agent prefers a high price, then
with increasing quality of the network, the value of the issue
that an agent generates tends to what it last sent or its maximum
value. Similarly if the QoS tends to zero, then the value of the
issue tends to its minimum acceptable value. Thus as the quality
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TABLE III
HISTORY ABOUT OPPONENT FOR UNSUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS
of the network degrades, the agent concedes more and a better
quality of the network implies less tendency to concede.
D. Experience Strategy ( )
The strategy models the experience of an agent regarding
negotiations in general and similar or parallel negotiations in
particular. Thus, an agent may have experience about previous
negotiations for the same items, with the same opponents, with
similar preferences and environmental constraints. Such expe-
rience may also be gained from parallel concurrent negotiation
threads in which an agent is engaged. For example, an agent a
may know that negotiation with agent b usually requires 10 s or
20 messages or that b is unreliable. An agent a may also have
some idea of the preferences of its opponents and this can be
used to provide a faster convergence to an acceptable response.
Added to network-awareness, agent a may also know the quality
of network between itself and b from concurrent or recent ne-
gotiations or from information gathered from other neighbors or
opponents of b. For example, agent a may know from past ex-
perience that the network connection between itself and agent
b deteriorates over time and therefore a chooses to concede fast
or not to bargain so as to reach a satisfactory agreement with a
minimum number of messages exchanged.
In more detail, let quantify the influence of an agent’s ex-
perience on its decisions. The higher , not only the more ex-
perienced is an agent, but also the more it chooses to apply its
experience rather than ignore it (as in the case of no time or lack
of computational power). The measure is thus quantified ac-
cording to how much experience an agent both has and uses for
that particular negotiation instance. An agent’s experience de-
pends on a number of factors and below we list those that are
relevant to automated service negotiation. These factors are used
to compute an agent’s experience, , for the experience strategy
( ). The experience of agent X about dealings with an opponent
Y is divided into three categories which broadly cover most of
the features of previous negotiations with Y:
1) when negotiations with Y ended with a rejection;
2) when the opponent Y accepted offers;
3) quality of the deals with Y. These experiences and the
corresponding weights attached to them are detailed in
Tables III–V (for each category) and Table VI.
Note that an agent can vary the importance attached to the dif-
ferent aspects of previous negotiations by varying the associated
weights. An item is associated to a band, for example, a low,
medium or high price band.
Let X denote the agent whose experience is being modeled
and, therefore, X records information about the history of its ne-
gotiations with opponent Y. Table III records the causes for pre-
viously unsuccessful negotiations with agent Y. For example,
the first row labels as the number of times Y made an offer
to X but X did not choose to agree. The weight associated to this
TABLE IV
HISTORY ABOUT OPPONENT FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS
TABLE V
QUALITY OF THE DEALS
TABLE VI
INFORMATION ABOUT AN OPPONENT
criteria is . Table IV records details of previously successful
negotiations with agent Y. For example, row 2 in Table IV refer-
ences the number of times ( ) that Y agreed in a particular
band and weight is attached to it. Table V represents the
quality of the deals obtained from previous negotiations with Y.
For example, the number of deals for a particular item is shown
in row 3 as ( ) and is given weight . Table VI aggregates
the various information on agent Y. Row 1 records positive re-
sponses from Y, row 2 the positive responses per band, row 3
the positive responses based on the type of the items and row 4
based on the quality of the network connection with Y.
The measure is computed and normalized from , ,
, , , , and . For example, agent X mod-
eling negotiations with agent Y calculates as follows:
where (11)
The set of issues (using the experience strategy)
is calculated in a similar way to the network-aware issue set
, but instead substituting by . For example for the
case of decreasing and a’s previous message being ( )
the issue that a generates at time using the experience
strategy, , is calculated as
(12)
Therefore, the above strategy considers previous negotia-
tions with a particular agent in order to guide its responses in
current negotiations with the same opponent. The experience
strategy, , may be combined with the network aware strategy,
, for a hybrid strategy to behave flexibly to more than one op-
erational factor. For example, the hybrid strategy and could
allow an agent to infer that given that the quality of communica-
tion is currently poor (from the network-aware strategy) and it
PAUROBALLY et al.: AUTOMATING NEGOTIATION FOR M-SERVICES 717
has been so for the last 2 h (from the experience strategy), then
it will most likely remain so for the next 10 min. This would be
especially useful if the agent’s deadline lies before the next 10
min.
V. COMBINING THE PROTOCOL AND THE STRATEGIES
The two negotiation algorithms and in, respec-
tively, Tables VII and VIII combine the bilateral protocol of
Fig. 4 with either of the three strategies , and (in Sec-
tion IV). These algorithms specify the decisions by agent a with
deadline , on receiving a set of issues and a state
state (e.g., offered or requested) from agent b at time . Agent a
responds with if needed. Let the flag better-than be set
to (i.e., agent a has received a re-
sponse from b better than it would have sent). A set of issues
received from b is compared with a’s goals to analyze the dif-
ference (given by distance) between what a received at time
and what it will send next at time (i.e., the variable dis-
tance measures, with respect to the score of the issue set re-
ceived and sent, how far a and b are to an agreement). Here dis-
tance has delimiters close, middle and far, ordered increasingly
with the difference of the valuation of a between its own and
b’s responses ( ). The domain (prefer-
ences) of a is denoted by . The set of possible next actions,
set-of-possible-next-actions, can be derived from the bilateral
protocol and denotes the decision for the next
state-triggering action by a.
In algorithm , a sends a timeout if its deadline has ex-
pired. Otherwise, if is not acceptable then a follows
algorithm . A set of issues is acceptable if each issue lies
within the reservation values or in the qualitative set of a. The
rest of algorithm considers the decisions of a after it has
received an acceptable set of issues. If the state is offered(b)
and not proposed(b) (take it or leave it acceptable offer from
b), then aagrees. If is better than what a would have
sent (better-than holds) or if a’s deadline is close, then a sends
an agree, if the state is offered, else an offer. If a does not have
much time left or better-than holds, then a does not bargain and
sends an offer with what b sent it. However if a’s deadline is not
close, then a makes a proposal if they are close or middle to an
agreement. In so doing, a moves to a higher level of commitment
than a suggest so as to reach an agreement faster. Otherwise, if
an agreement is not within reach and there is enough time left,
then a bargains with suggest and request.
Algorithm portrays the decisions of a, at time ,
when it receives an unacceptable set of issues from b at time .
In this algorithm, a does not find it worthwhile to agree to
and responds with a more favorable set of issues, . If a’s
deadline is close, then a refrains from bargaining and sends an
offer or proposal with , as a penultimate step to termina-
tion. Otherwise if an agreement is close, then a triggers the pro-
posed state. If an agreement is not near and there is enough time,
then a bargains through requests and suggestions.
The characteristics of the network or an agent’s experience
are used when evaluating the set of issues and generating
, which are then used in algorithms and and in
the conditions better_than and distance. An agent can flexibly
TABLE VII
BILATERAL ALGORITHM FOR ACCEPTABLE ISSUE SET (AC)
TABLE VIII
ALGORITHM FOR UNACCEPTABLE ISSUE SET (NAC)
choose its strategies privately and reuse the above two algo-
rithms given that the protocol is public and complied with. The
calculated set of issues from other strategies can be adjusted to
take into account the m-service’s domain through the eventual
combination with strategy . Thus, in our approach, it is easy
to adjust the response of an agent if it chooses to consider the
variations in the quality of the network. As a result, our algo-
rithms and and the three specified strategies can be
combined with other strategies so that the latter strategies be-
come adaptive to time-constraints, communication capabilities
or the social environment.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE
NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS
This section is an initial evaluation of our m-commerce ne-
gotiation mechanisms. It concentrates on varying the adaptative
capability of the agents in relation to the quality of the network
and their negotiation experience. More specifically, the perfor-
mance of the algorithms is analyzed with respect to a set of iden-
tified performance metrics for automated negotiation. The task
of such a performance analysis is to explain the run-time be-
havior of the system configurations, compare between strate-
gies, and ultimately to validate and optimize our algorithms.
718 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 33, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 2003
There are a number of parameters that affect the performance
of an m-service negotiation. However, in conducting our exper-
iments, we choose to vary those that we believe are the most
obvious in this domain. These include the following.
• Various characteristics of mobile telecommunication net-
works (including QoS, latency and error rates as discussed
in Section III-B). These are used in strategy when cal-
culating the rate of concessions.
• Adaptability of an agent. This depends on which strategies
an agent chooses and range from no negotiation at all, to
complexcalculationsaboutexperience,observedbehaviors
andqualityofservice.ThestrategiesinSectionIVarevaried
and combined to analyze their performance relative to each
other. We are then able to analyze the benefits of adapting
to the environment and the features in Section III-B.
• Complexity of the tasks and the agents’ workloads. These
are varied by altering the number of issues in a negotia-
tion, the dependency between the issues and the difference
between the agents’ preferences. In particular, we explore
how varying the initial preferences and the number of is-
sues influence the quality of the deals reached.
• Resources of the participants; including their deadlines,
money and reservation values (as discussed in Sec-
tion III-C). The deadlines and reservation values of the
agents are varied to see how the negotiation degrades
as the quality of the network decreases or the deadlines
becomes closer.
• Knowledge and beliefs of an agent about its opponents.
This includes experience from past negotiations for
prediction about future ones and trust of other agents.
The experience of the agents is captured through (as in
the strategy ) and varied versus the quality of the deal
reached and the quality of the network.
• Number of concurrent threads per agent. In this paper, we
choose thirty concurrent negotiations between buyer and
seller agents, with the set of issues consisting of price,
delivery time and quantity.
As we vary the above parameters, we analyze the adaptive be-
havior of the agents through the following performance metrics.
• Whether an agreement has been reached. Thus we analyze
whether the negotiating parties manage to converge to an
agreement.
• Values of the issues and the utility of the exchanged set of
issues over time. The utility of an exchanged issue set is
computed by the receiver agent using the evaluation func-
tion defined in Section IV-B. These values and utilities
are measured for each negotiation thread and include the
utility of the deals that are agreed upon.
• Rates of concessions of the buyer and seller agents. These
can be calculated from the difference between consecutive
setsof issuessentbyanagentdividedbythetimeperiodover
whichtheyaresent( ).
• Times taken to evaluate, generate, send and receive mes-
sages, and time for agreements to be produced.
• Processing costs of negotiation. These include the addition
of the costs for evaluating and responding to a received set
of issues and for message exchange.
Fig. 5. Thirty concurrent buyer–seller negotiations.
• Number of message exchanges per negotiation. This is
simply the sum of the messages sent by both agents.
The remainder of this section presents an evaluation, with re-
spect to the above metrics, of the strategies identified in Sec-
tion IV, while varying the above parameters. In the simulations,
buyer and seller agents conduct multiple concurrent negotia-
tions with each other by exchanging a set of issues over an item.
Let denote the seller and b denote the buyer. The items are sep-
arated into price bands low, medium and high. The issues being
negotiated are price, delivery and quantity. We choose these is-
sues because they occur frequently in our motivating scenarios
and they are reasonably generic. Each agent has an initial pref-
erence over the issue set where buyer agents are designed to
prefer low prices, short delivery times and low quantity. Sellers
are designed to prefer high prices, long delivery times and high
quantity. Each agent has its own (private) deadline to conclude a
particular negotiation. Finally, seller agents start the negotiation
by sending a message according to their initial preferences and
resources. Let denote the seller and b denote the buyer.
The behavior of the negotiation model is evaluated by con-
ducting a series of experiments. First, in Section VI-A, we
investigate if the agents manage to converge or find agreements
as their deadlines vary or when an agent has a very close deadline.
This is toanalyze theagents’behaviorsgivendifferentconstraints
on time. Second, in Section VI-B, we explore how the agents
vary the set of issues they exchange as their available resources
change over a negotiation instance. We measure the utility of
the exchanged set and the deals reached and we compare the
agents’ behavior with respect to different negotiation threads. In
this context, different negotiation threads show different agents’
behaviors when their preferences varies. Therefore to compare
the resources used for different levels of interactions, third, in
Section VI-C we analyze the processing costs for a negotiation
that consists only of an offer-agree interaction and for more
interactive forms of negotiation. Naturally, we expect the costs
of negotiation to be more than the fixed price model, but we
also expect some benefit from negotiation in terms of obtaining
information about the participants (which in essence is part of the
experience strategy). In addition, for evaluating the experience
strategy, we conduct concurrent negotiations so as to both reflect
realistic situations and to observe how the experience of parallel
negotiation instances influence an agent’s behavior.
A. Reducing Negotiation to a Single Offer
An alternating offers bargaining model is used in [22] and
[23] for computationally limited negotiations. It is shown that
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the equilibrium strategies for the model result in a single shot
take-it or leave-it strategy. Thus the agents wait without ex-
changing offers until one of their deadlines arrives and then the
agent with the earlier deadline concedes and makes an offer that
the other agent may accept. Fig. 5 reflects this behavior for the
agents with closer deadlines. The top (dotted) graph represents
the final issue set obtained by the seller agent and the lower
one the final issue set obtained by the buyer agent. In this ex-
periment, the deadline of at least one of the parties, the seller
here, , is varied so as to lie close to the start of the negotia-
tion. This means that one party has significantly less resources
than the other and, therefore, is at a disadvantage or both parties
have close deadlines. In this way, we can analyze the behavior
of the agents when they have no time left, no_time_left is true,
or there is a disparity in their relative amount of resources avail-
able. Specifically, we investigate if the strategy allows the
agents to still be able to find a deal. Here, we observe that they
do so by one party, the one with the closer deadline, making
a large concession and basically sending a take-it-leave-it offer
that precludes any bargaining. If both agents have close dead-
lines, the first agent that initiates the negotiation (the seller in
this case) makes a large concession.
Reducing thebilateralnegotiationmechanismtoa singleoffer-
accept or reject strategy, without prior suggestions and iterations,
has the advantage of decreasing the costs by sending fewer mes-
sages and allowing agreements to be found without delay. How-
ever assuming that deadlines are common knowledge is not prac-
tical, as found in [6]. We do not assume this here. Moreover a
single shot negotiation does not embody bargaining. Normally
the two agents have different preferences and their intersection
is not guaranteed since the agents have no sure information about
their opponents’ strategies and preferences. In such cases, nego-
tiation allows agents to probe each other’s range of acceptability
so that they may move their demands and issue set to create a mu-
tual acceptance region.Thisprocess could take the form ofa “trial
and error” exchange of messages where the agents are providing
feedback and learning what is acceptable. Given this, it is hard to
see how a single offer negotiation allows the agents to revise their
beliefs and preferences to converge toward an agreement. More-
over,proactiveagents that negotiate inadvanceof theirdeadlines,
so as to plan ahead or schedule their tasks, are discouraged by a
reactive strategy. Also, in parallel negotiations, a seller or buyer
may find other interesting deals rather than wait for a deadline to
arrive.
In summary, the aim of this simulation is to observe how the
agents adapt when they have close deadlines. This relates to the
feature in Section III-C that negotiations in the m-commerce do-
mainusuallyhavedeadlines.Someof thesedeadlinemaybecome
closebecauseofrepeateddisconnections, increasedlatencyorde-
terioration of the network due to a change in location. From this
set of experiments, we can conclude that the time-aware strategy
ensures that agents can still find agreements in such time-con-
strained environments. It does soby conceding and making a final
offer that is acceptable to its opponent.
B. Valuation of Deals for Concurrent Negotiations
This section focuses on the exchanged set of issues and their
valuation within three concurrent negotiation threads between
TABLE IX
RESERVATION VALUES FOR PRICE FOR BUYERS AND SELLERS
TABLE X
INITIAL PREFERENCES OF BUYERS AND SELLERS
TABLE XI
WEIGHTS OF ISSUES BY AGENTS
buyer and seller agents. Table IX gives the minimum and
maximum prices of the seller ([ ]) and buyer
([ ]) agents for low, medium and high item
bands. We choose three threads to study the agents’ behavior
for each band.
Table X shows the initial preferences of the buyer and seller
for each of their negotiation threads. For example, the first row
of Table X shows that in the first negotiation thread, the buyer
agent prefers a low band item, with price 109, quantity 6, and
delivery time 131. Similarly the 6th (last) row shows that in its
third negotiation thread, the seller prefers a high band item, price
between 800 and 900, quantity 1–20 and delivery time between
5–120. Table XI indicates the weights each agent associates with
the various negotiation issues. These weights are the same for a
given agent, for all its concurrent negotiation threads. Moreover,
an agent associates the same importance to an issue in all its
concurrent negotiations. Specifically, the weights to in
Table VI, used in the experience strategy, for the buyer are, ( ,
11), ( , 5), ( ), ( , 20), ( , 5), ( ), ( , 20), ( ,
5), ( ), ( , 20), ( , 5), ( , 1) and for the seller are
( , 20), ( , 5), ( , 20), ( , 5), ( , 20), ( , 5), ( , 20),
( , 5), ( , 20), ( , 10), ( , 2), ( , 20).
Fig. 6 shows the values of the issues in the set received by
the buyer agent ( ) during its concurrent negotiation threads
(Buyer Thread 1, Thread 2 and Thread 3). The axes denote the
issues price, quantity and delivery. Recall the seller prefers high
prices and high delivery times. As can be seen, each negotiation
thread produces a different surface in the graph corresponding
to the band of the item being traded; thread 1 has a low band
price, thread 2 a medium band price and thread 3 a high band
(as given in Table X).
In Fig. 6, on all three surfaces, there is one point with a high
delivery time that stands out. This point shows the seller starting
the negotiation (say at time ) by sending a set of issues ( )
near to its preferences (since it has no knowledge of the initial
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Fig. 6. Buyer’s issue-value dynamics received from the seller for three
negotiation threads.
preferences of the buyer). When the seller receives the first issue
set from the buyer ( ), it updates its issue set to reflect the
knowledge it has just learnt about the buyer. This explains the
large difference, on each of the surfaces, between the first and
second issue set ( ) received by the buyer.
After sending the second issue set, the seller consistently con-
cedes. It decreases the price at a lower rate than both decreasing
the quantity and increasing the quanity. These consistent changes
in values lead to an overall concession by the seller, when multi-
plied by the relative weights of each issue [as per (1)]. The same
behavior regarding the seller’s concessions (from evaluating the
messages received by the buyer) is reflected for all three nego-
tiation threads and the corresponding three surfaces in Fig. 6. It
should also be noted that for the high band item, fewer messages
are received by the buyer, than for the medium priced item and
even fewer for the low priced item. For a high-priced item, the
agents perform more computation before sending a message (be-
cause they risk more money), resulting in fewer messages being
sent in that negotiation.
In a similar vein, Fig. 7 shows the seller’s version of the values
of the issue set it received ( ) during the three concurrent
negotiation threads (Seller Thread 1, Thread 2, and Thread 3).
Again there are three distinct surfaces to reflect the fact that the
item in each negotiation thread has a different band price. Since
the buyer does not start the negotiation, it consistently concedes
toward the seller’s preferences. Thus, there is no initial point un-
commonly near to the buyer’s preferences at the start. As a ne-
gotiation progresses, the buyer responds to the seller’s message
by asking for less quantity without proportionally decreasing
the price, but increasing its delivery time to the buyer’s advan-
tage. Overall, the buyer moves toward the seller’s preferences by
“conceding” in offering less price, but with less quantity. This is
offset by asking for a lower delivery time, since the buyer places
more relative importance on delivery times and less on price
and quantity than the seller. In addition, Fig. 7 shows, for each
thread, the number of messages received by the buyer matches
the number received by the seller in Fig. 6 (as would be expected
given the alternating nature of the protocol).
Fig. 8 aggregates the two graphs, in Figs. 6 and 7, and is taken
from a particular angle. The graph shows six threads – three
concurrent negotiations run by each agent. The surfaces in the
graph are grouped in pairs with Thread ( ) for a
buyer agent coupled with Thread for a seller agent. Thus each
Fig. 7. Seller issue-value dynamics for three negotiation threads.
Fig. 8. Buyer and seller issue-value dynamics for three negotiation threads.
pair shows the message exchange between these two threads.
As in Fig. 6, the graphs show the initial set of issues received
( ) and evaluated by the buyer to be especially close to the
seller’s preferences. After the seller’s first message, each pair of
surfaces show the convergence of the two surfaces toward each
other. This means that the buyer and seller are conceding ac-
cording to the time they have left, and they are therefore showing
time-aware behaviors. Each pair also shows a similar number of
messages being exchanged per agent and negotiation instance,
and indicates the total amount of message exchange per negoti-
ation instance.
Fig. 9 shows the scores of the points in Fig. 8 along time. It
expresses the score of the issue set received and evaluated by
each agent versus time, for each negotiation thread. The lines
labeled with Buyer Thread 1 to Thread 3 show, for each thread,
the sequence of the buyer’s evaluations of the messages it re-
ceives from the sender as the negotiation progresses (mutatis
mutandis for seller Thread 1 to Thread 3). For the same nego-
tiation instance (e.g., seller’s and buyer’s ),
an agreement is reached with a particular issue set, say issue
set . Each agent obtains a different score for this agreement,
according to their chosen weights for an issue and their utility
function ( or ). Similarly to Fig. 8, the lines labeled
Buyer and Seller are coupled, since they are
exchanges regarding the same negotiation instance, about the
same item. The band price determines the region in which the a
pair of lines lie.
The lines labeled Buyer demonstrate that as time
elapses, the buyer believes the seller is conceding and gaining
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Fig. 9. Buyer and seller deal value dynamics for three negotiation threads.
less. Although the gradient of the three Buyer lines
are negative, the rate of concessions by the seller differ for each
negotiation thread. We observe that the line labeled with Buyer
Thread 3 is less steep than that for Buyer Thread 2. This means
that in time-constrained environments, the seller adapts by con-
ceding more for a low band and less for a higher band because
the seller is selling more low band items than high band ones.
Therefore the seller is ready to concede more for a lower band
item so as to avoid a rejection.
The lines labeled with Seller shows the seller’s eval-
uation of the issue set it receives from the buyer ( ).
According to the seller, the buyer gains over time during a ne-
gotiation (given by a positive gradient). Similarly for the seller
threads, it can be shown that the gradient of the lines are less
steep for a higher price bands than lower price bands. Thus in
time-constrained negotiations, contrary to the seller, the buyer
adapts by conceding more for higher band prices because it
buying less higher band items and therefore can afford to con-
cede more, depending on the total price.
It should also be noted that each line in a pair, expressing each
agent’s response in an instance, converge toward an intersection.
This shows the score for each buyer and seller moves toward an
agreed set of issues. This agreed set yields a different score for
each participant, depending on their preferences.
Fig. 9 also shows that it is not necessarily the least expensive
items that produce a higher score. For example, Buyer and Seller
Threads 2 produce a higher score than Threads 1 and Threads 3.
We can thus conclude that it is more profitable for both the buyer
and seller to negotiate about medium band items, than either
high or low band items because Figs. 6 and 7 show that they both
obtain more quantity for medium band items than in the other
two bands. In addition, according to the weights in Table XI,
they both attach more importance on the quantity of items than
the price. Hence by (1), they achieve more for medium band
items. In turn, it is more profitable for them to negotiate about
low band items than high band items because the quantity of
items in the final deal is higher for a low band item than for a
high band one. It makes sense that the buyer cannot afford to
buy high-priced items.
In summary, in this experiment, we consider how the strate-
gies for time and experience-awareness allow an agent to
adapt given it has different negotiation instances and different
Fig. 10. Processing costs when negotiating and not negotiating.
preferences. The resources that vary in this domain include time,
the price an agent can afford, how soon does it needs the item
(delivery time) and the desired quantity of the item. As these
resources vary, we see that the agents concede accordingly, de-
pending on the importance they place on each issue. Having no
experience experience, the first message sent by an agent often
lies outside the other agent’s acceptable region. Therefore expe-
rience-awareness helps to start the negotiation with an accept-
able issue set, especially in situations where the agents have low
resources even at the start. Furthermore, experience awareness
allows the initiator to conceal its preferences from its opponents
since the initiator does not start the negotiation with an issue set
close to its own preferences. We also conclude that in m-com-
merce environments (where timeouts, disconnections, the time
for message exchange, and latency affect the time an agent has
to find an agreement) then by using our strategies, agents can
better adapt to the time-constraints to find agreements.
C. Processing Costs for Negotiation
There are two types of interactions that can take place in this
simulation – with and without negotiation. When not negoti-
ating, the buyer makes a one-shot offer to the seller (as per Sec-
tion VI-A). The seller then either accepts or rejects it. Fig. 10
shows the processing costs incurred by agents undertaking 30
simultaneous purchase/provision processes (i.e., they are each
buying or selling 30 items in parallel). As above, the buyer and
seller are given the same preferences and reservation values.
Buyer agents retain preference for low price and quantity and
short delivery times, and sellers prefer high prices and quantities
with long delivery times. In Fig. 10, the vertical axis (Logical
Inferences) represents resource utilization by agents- including
both processing (evaluation and response generation) and mes-
sage exchange. The lower line shows the total costs for all seller
and buyer agents utilizing fixed pricing, while the higher line
shows the costs for the negotiating agents (using the experience
strategy ).
With fixed pricing, the agents reach deals as soon as possible
(with retry on rejection). This is respresented by the sharp spike
on the left hand side. The agents then continue to incur some re-
source costs whilst they monitor for the correct delivery of items
(buyers) or payment (sellers). All payments and deliveries are
concluded by time 110. In comparison, the resource utilization
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of the negotiating agents is spread throughout time until all out-
standing deliveries/payments are closed (at time 152). (Delivery
times with the negotiating agents cover a wider range than their
fixed price counterpart because this issue is negotiable). As can
be seen, resource usage decreases with time because the number
of open negotiations decrease as agreements are reached. There-
fore there is a steady decline as deals are finalised and items are
delivered or paid for.
Incomparingtheoperationalcostsofnegotiatingandnonnego-
tiating agents, it is evident that negotiation is more costly. For
this implementation, comparing the processing cost of agent, in
total (i.e., including all other costs associated with the running
agent) yields the following: a negotiating agent uses 4.96 times
more resources than its fixed price counter-part. If the base op-
erating cost of the agent (i.e., without resource costs related to
other agent functionality) is removed from this calculation, ne-
gotiation is 14.8 times more costly than the fixed-price method.
Thisvalue ishighbecausenegotiatingagents retainstate informa-
tion that is necessary to enact their strategies (fixed price retains
negligible state information).This includes informationabout the
exchangedvaluesduringanegotiation(forpurposesofexamining
concession rates, obtaining feedback for adaptation, etc.) as well
as reasoning processes for ensuring coherence with the negotia-
tion protocol. It is critical to be mindful that these specific oper-
ating figures cannot be assumed to hold beyond the context of the
software used for this simulation. Although we believe that the
broad trend is generic.
However, these results do not lead us to conclude that nego-
tiation is bad. First negotiations allow the agents to change the
set of issues so as to fall within the acceptable region of both
parties. This flexibility is lost in fixed price trading since most
of the time the agents do not know their opponents’ preferences
and utilities which often leads to rejections. Such rejections are
a drain on the system’s resources. In our negotiations, the agents
perform inferences so as to store the state, the history of a nego-
tiation, and the information about their opponents, the environ-
ment and how they themselves adapted to a resource-bounded
environment. Thus, the agents accumulate experience. This ex-
perience is especially useful when using our experience-aware
strategies since they allow adaptation to specific m-commerce
environments. For example, knowing its opponent preferences
and rates of concessions, an agent no longer needs to make an
overly large concession if its deadline is very close. Rather, it
only needs to make a concession that is just enough to obtain a
deal. Also for agents initiating a negotiation, where these agents
have a close deadline or their underlying connection limits their
communication capability, then knowing what is likely to be a
successful deal is crucial.
Second, although extra facilities and costs are required to
support the strategies presented in this paper, (when compared
to the costs for not negotiating), these facilities are likely to
be required by other functional aspects of intelligent agents.
Thus, much of the additional cost of negotiating using our
strategies may be shared with other adaptive mechanisms in
agents. For example, Fig. 11 shows a buyer agent’s experi-
ence of negotiating with two suppliers. It portrays the final
value of each deal ( ) against the number of message
exchanges required versus the initial distance between the first
Fig. 11. Successful past negotiations.
issue/value set exchanged between the customer and supplier
( ). As can be seen, supplier 2 requires
longer exchanges than supplier 1 and also results in a lower
quality deal. Intuitively, it would be sensible for the customer
to approach supplier 1 instead of 2. Yet, this does not take into
account other operational factors that are important for agents in
mobile domains. For example, the cost of communication (time,
financial cost, etc) may differ according to the recipient and
the agent’s local context. Secondly, the need for predictability
may be paramount. Thus, it may be necessary for an agent to
be able to plan more effectively by reasoning more accurately
about future expected resource costs. This would allow (and is
required for) agents to actively manage risk [24]. (A risk averse
agent may nevertheless choose to select supplier 2 because the
region defining the costs associated with negotiating is less
spread out than for supplier 1.Therefore it may be more certain
about the costs it will incur during negotiation.) The agent may
therefore trade utility for predictability thereby allowing it to
plan its future resource commitments more effectively.
A third advantage of negotiation in this context relates to
the time taken for fixed price exchanges versus negotiation. In
the example above, the fixed price mechanism is assumed to
occur as far in advance of delivery time as possible. In this sit-
uation the customer and supplier agents must incur additional
processing costs where nonpayment or nondelivery is possible.
Because there is no contact between the customer and supplier
between the time when a deal is reached and the delivery/pay-
ment time, there is an increasing degree of uncertainty present
if the agent is operating in a domain where failure to deliver is
an acceptable reality. At the other extreme, an agent that under-
goes commodity/service acquisition just-in-time runs the risk of
not reaching a deal in time. In contrast, the negotiating agent is
in contact with the dialogue partner for a manipulable period
(by managing time-outs and increasing negotiation time length
by modifying concession rates). When combined with levels of
commitment associated with different speech-acts of the pro-
tocol [24], both agents are able to manage uncertainty by having
recently been in contact and also being able to infer information
about the commitment to a deal of the negotiation partner.
In summary, this simulation evaluates the various costs of
negotiation and compares them with a fixed price offer-agree
interaction. We place our evaluation in the context of the ex-
perience strategy. Using such a strategy, an agent can adapt to
a change of resources or limited resources as is frequently the
case in m-commerce. Our model ensures an agent does not need
to concede more than it should if it is running out of resources.
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In addition, a seller can hide its true valuation or spend less re-
sources on negotiation by sending an issue set nearer to a known
customer’s preferences. Finally, the experience strategy also al-
lows an agent to accumulate information about its network con-
nection with its opponent. Thus an agent may choose not to deal
with a specific opponent because it knows that there is a faulty
network connection between them which often results in the
breakdown of their interactions. Moreover given concurrent ne-
gotiations, an agent may restrict the number of parallel threads
it operates depending on the bandwidth limitations and fluctua-
tions (as discussed in Section III-B).
VII. RELATED WORK
Much of the related work regarding m-services is concerned
with service discovery. For example, [25] provides an evaluation
of the Jini discovery infrastructure and develops a framework for
dynamic service discovery through a hybrid of service-oriented
and agent-oriented architectures. Other work on service dis-
covery includes [26] which surveys exisiting service discovery
architectures, [27] which implements location aware agents
embedded in mobile devices and seeking information via ad-hoc
networks and teams, and [9] that presents an architecture for
m-service discovery and brokering. Our work considers the next
step on from m-service discovery, namely m-service negotiation.
There is substantial research on automated negotiation [4],
[7], [21], [28], but none of this work specifically considers the
m-service domain and the particular set of requirements it in-
duces. As such, there are many different forms of negotiation
(including auctions and bi-lateral encounters) that are tackled
using many different techniques (including game theory, heuris-
tics and argumentation) (see [4] for an overview). Here, how-
ever, we focus exclusively on bilateral encounters (since we
found these to be especially prevalent in this domain [5]).
Some approaches to automated negotiation assume perfect
rationality of agents, where the strategies and the best actions are
computed instantaneously [7]. Although these lead to important
theoretical contributions to negotiation strategies (such as opti-
mality and equilibrium in constrained environments), the un-
derlying assumptions are often inappropriate for practical con-
texts. Thus, our work seeks to develop models that can be used
in practice (the downside of which is that results tend to concen-
trate on typical performance with few guarantees and outcomes
need to be determined empirically). Therefore, we concentrate
on ways to implement m-service negotiation and obtain empir-
ical results. We do not assume that participants adopt a single
dominant strategy because we are interested in how to design
the various strategies that allow participants to bargain. Also,
current research in AI negotiation and agent interaction tends to
separate the design of intelligent strategies and the specification
of agent communication languages and protocols. Such work
tends to focus on either one or the other. In constrast, we seek to
bridge this gap with a richer bilateral protocol, associated with
resource-bounded strategies.
There is also significant research carried out in AI regarding
dominant strategies, Nash equilibria, Bayes-Nash equilibria,
Bayesian equilibria for auctions, load balancing or resource
sharing bi-lateral negotiations. It would be useful to exploit
such work for a theoretical evaluation of our different envi-
ronmental strategies. However, there remain a number of open
issues regarding with such work (including the generation
of appropriate utility functions [24]). It is also notable that
the agents in our scenarios are not negotiating for sharing a
resource [29] or performing a joint task such as delivering
parcels [23]. Although we could say the trading of an m-service
is a joint task of exchanging the service, the competition is not
in accessing the service but is rather in its profitable purchase
and sale. Therefore, we adopt the intuitive service-oriented
approach and notation in [20] and [21], which embodies the
concept of electronic transactions.
Finally, most of the existing work on bargaining strategies
applies to a single negotiation process or computing a single re-
sponse. Generally speaking, it does not consider the possibility
of concurrent negotiation threads. This is a shortcoming because
the ability to exploit concurrent negotiation threads allows an
agent to use the experience-strategy to achieve better deals (as
discussed in Section VI-C).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
This paper proposes m-service negotiation as a key enabling
technology for electronic commerce via agents located on mo-
bile devices. In this domain the characteristics of wireless com-
munications constrain interactions between agents and, there-
fore, this paper we identify and discuss those characteristics
that most affect automated negotiation. Given these constraints,
novel protocols and strategies for peer-to-peer negotiation be-
tween two agents are developed. In particular, three strategies
are proposed that enable agents to adapt to their deadlines and
preferences, to the quality of the network and to their experience
regarding similar negotiations. These negotiation mechanisms
are then analyzed and we can conclude that they allow negoti-
ating agents to adapt to time and resource limitations in order to
find agreements. Their concessions are dependent on both the
amount of available resources but also on their preferences.
Further work includes the development of resource-bounded
strategies that may be useful for the m-commerce domain, the
design of an agent’s utility functions and dynamic levels of com-
mitments associated to speech-acts (as mentioned in [24]). More
negotiation simulations are being executed on our test-bed and
future work includes more extensive analysis of the reliability
of the algorithms and different strategies with respect ot the pa-
rameters and metrics in Section VI. Specifically, we aim to pro-
vide more performance results regarding various values for the
quality of service of the network to show the agent’s adaption
using both the network-aware and the experience-aware strate-
gies. We can also analyze more complex forms of evaluating
and generating the responses in the various strategies through
market-oriented mechanisms and refinement of the strategy
to analyze other forms of experience in m-service negotiations.
Finally, we are also evaluating the robustness of m-service ne-
gotiation through synchronization layers for message exchange
and belief revision in the agents [30].
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